According to reports EconomyNews According to the election, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, spoke about Saeed Jalili’s opposition to the second channel of negotiations with the United States. You can read part of this conversation below.
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Why was the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council in the time of Mr. Jalili opposed to the second channel of negotiations with the United States in Muscat?
It is detailed. I talked about it a lot. At that time, a way was finally opened, which was called negotiation, the second way. One path was the P5 + 1 and one path was the same direct negotiations with the United States. Through Oman, which the gentleman had ordered, this dilemma must proceed in unison, and the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, who is the president, must be in charge of both ways. Dr. Ahmadinejad at that time refused to accept this responsibility. We had to somehow get Mr. Jalili’s consent. Because Mr. Ahmadinejad himself had left.
It is said that Mr. Ahmadinejad wrote a letter to the leadership that I can no longer take action in this regard and we must go under the burden of the resolutions.
I do not know of such a letter. But when I told him the opinion of Hazrat Agha, they said I was not ready to do so and I advise you not to enter this path. We entered. Mr. Zarif had a nice discussion and said that a year was wasted, that is, since Hazrat Agha did not oppose our nuclear negotiations with the Americans, which is nuclear. Sir [البته] They said it should not be political. At the time of the Oman talks, Obama was on the verge of running for a second term and was in fierce competition with Romney. I even read their polls once. Romney was 51 percent and Obama 49 percent. It was so tight and the United States was ready to settle with us as soon as possible that it would be a winner against Romney who would enter the race with confidence. It was a very good opportunity. Through you, I ask Dr. Zarif, if possible, to publish a large binder related to the secret negotiations in Oman. It is very readable and very informative. It is no longer a secret because it has been revealed. There are even manuscripts. It is of great historical value for future generations to know what the truth was. I asked a friend if they could do such a thing, but I did not have the opportunity to ask Dr. Zarif. I want Dr. Zarif to do this in order to stay for future generations, otherwise, God forbid, they may disappear all at once. When they allowed us, we started working, but Mr. Ahmadinejad, who withdrew, tried to coordinate with Mr. Jalili. They were not very satisfied. I tried so hard.
How could the leadership agree but Mr. Jalili disagree?
Now there are details that will answer your questions if those documents are published. I do not want to be spoken in my own language.
You do not want to say how these stone throws were …
They said you have a wrong impression and it is not like that and … now I have nothing to do. Eventually it was questioned again and it took two or three months for us to go and sit down with the Americans for the first time and negotiate. We have said before that we have permission to negotiate, but because it took so long, the Americans thought we were lying. They were waiting for us to talk. Finally our group left. Mr. Khaji and Mr. Zabib and Mr. Baharvand and Dr. Najafi. They left for the first time; The Americans were also surprised and said that we did not believe that they would come and why it took so long and … it is a separate discussion. The minutes of the meetings are all the same. Until the second time we wanted to go, there was a problem again.
Of course, Hazrat Agha had conditionally accepted the principle of negotiation and we complied with those conditions. 4 It was a condition that the negotiations were not at the level of the foreign minister. Be nuclear specific. Negotiation is not for negotiation, that is, if you see that our main demand was not accepted, cut it off and the president is the coordinator, so that we could not operate the fourth one, and that is why it was lame and time consuming. We negotiated for a year, which took a year.
They did not let me go a second time, and I said no more with my own authority as foreign minister. They went and led to the recognition of the principle of enrichment and said that you should address our concerns. We said it should become an official thing, because we were still talking to the Americans. And we said that the United States should go and get the agreement of the other members of the P5 + 1. We knew that if America accepted, the others would have no problem. Therefore, it led to Sultan Qaboos (God bless him, he was a respectable and compassionate man and was very interested in Iran and he owed his monarchy to the Iranians and had told me many times) writing a letter to Dr. Ahmadinejad. The US representative William Burns and the Iranian representative Mr. Khaji were in front of me and the US representative announced that they recognize Iran’s enrichment and Iran will address their concerns.
We gave this letter to the service of the Supreme Leader and Mr. Ahmadinejad, and then we wrote a roadmap on how to continue the rest of the work until the end of 1991 and the elections, when they called from Mr.’s office and said leave the rest of the negotiations to the government. the next. The good thing was that the ground for negotiation was opened. The principle of enrichment was accepted and the rest continued in Mr. Rouhani’s government.
Although the leadership authorized it, the question for me is how it took three months for the first trip to take place
I will not say more, I said that if Mr. Zarif publishes those talks, part of your question will be answered there.
What was Mr. Jalili doing in the P5 + 1 talks that did not reach a conclusion?
Despite my disagreement with Mr. Jalili, I have to make this point. I was probably the first person to be from the beginning to the end of the nuclear debate. Perhaps the rest of the loved ones entered the nuclear file at various stations. But since I was Iran’s representative in the IAEA, I was aware of everything from the beginning. At first, this case was in the hands of the Atomic Energy Organization, then when its dimensions expanded, it was handed over to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kharazi. Later, Mr. Kharazi saw that its dimensions were wider than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was entrusted to the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, namely Dr. Rouhani.
The time of Dr. Rouhani was done. The international community was against us. They had created a fake file. In my opinion, Dr. Rouhani’s art was to prevent this global consensus. That is, they accepted a series of restrictions. Suspension of enrichment and nuclear activities for six months to build trust and return activities. Six months became one year. One year became two years and they did not fulfill their commitment that Hazrat Agha said at the end of Dr. Khatami’s government because they were not bound by their commitment, you are no longer obliged to keep your commitment. Come back. But in practice, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s government did.
This is an important point. We had an experience here of Western misbehavior. We suspended for two years and they did not comply. Mr. Jalili was somewhat inflexible. A value of what width. His flexibility was low. Of course, what would you do if you were in his place and saw this background?
Finally, they were fundamentally opposed to negotiations
Not anymore. They were negotiators
Well, they did not take a step forward, while they also opposed the second channel.
The reason he did not take a step forward was that Mr. Jalili tightened his grip. They also felt empowered because our nuclear industry had been shut down for two years. That is, we were at the beginning of industrialization in the industrial field. That is why the Westerners pressed and they resisted until they issued three resolutions against us. 1803, 1835 and 1929. From ’86 when he took office to ’89, we got three resolutions for the same resistance that he put up. It was 90 when the Americans came and said they were ready to negotiate with you. Why did they mediate the Omani? Because they saw that it was useless. On the one hand, Iran stands firm on its own rights, and on the other hand, the United States wants to impose its views, but it has reached a dead end. Until they got here, they saw that our nuclear industry was moving forward with strength and momentum. We started Ghani 20% during the time of Mr. Ahmadinejad. Westerners did not believe. Browse their media. At first they said you were lying. They interviewed one of our fellow students. He said that Salehi never lied, but I do not know why he is lying this time. I was asked if you were accused of lying. I said there is nothing wrong with it. Finally, the agency reports that we have either produced or not. If he said we produced it, the loved one who said we are lying should apologize, if the agency said they did not produce it, I apologize. The United States saw that while we were supposed to give the 4% that we produce, it would be enriched outside Russia and go to France to become a fuel plate, and then come to Iran and it would take two and a half years, we would do it in less than We built it for two years. We gathered great people like Shahid Shahriari and we were really able to perform miracles. They saw that it was useless for Iran to go on a quadruped in the nuclear industry. So what did Obama say when he came? He said that we tried our best to open the nuts and bolts of Iran’s nuclear industry, but we could not, and this science is gone. The Omani mediated the negotiations. This is where they retreated. This path led to this. Not that Mr. Jalili did not agree now, Mr. Jalili also agreed to take steps to enrich 20%, of course step by step; Finally, they had suggestions, but it was not accepted. We want to put ourselves in a fair position. It is fair that I was negotiating in place of Mr. Jalili, after two years of negligence, I certainly did not listen to them. Of course, I have to say that people are important and everyone has their own way of working. If I want to have a definition of Mr. Jalili, I saw him as an idealist in the negotiations and I saw Dr. Zarif as a pragmatist.
Didn’t the fact that the leadership said that negotiations were not for negotiations mean that they were not satisfied with Mr. Jalili’s negotiations with the P5 + 1?
I can not say very conclusively. But my general feeling was that Hazrat Agha expected the negotiations to be concluded within a reasonable time frame and not to capture ourselves, and if we saw that the negotiations were prolonged to isolate us, we would pull ourselves out of this impasse. Let’s kill. Regarding the second way, Hazrat Agha emphasized that we do not want to negotiate anymore. If you see that this is not the case, let’s stop altogether. Your inference is that, sir, Iran does not want to be a prisoner of negotiation now, now in any negotiation.